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Ashwini Deshpande and Naila Kabeer1 
 
Abstract 
 
Based on primary data from a large household survey in seven districts in West Bengal in India, 
this paper analyses the reasons underlying low labor force participation of women. In particular, 
we try to disentangle the intertwined strands of choice, constraints posed by domestic work and 
care responsibilities, and the predominant understanding of cultural norms as factors explaining 
the low labor force participation as measured by involvement in paid work. We document the 
fuzziness of the boundary between domestic work and unpaid (and therefore invisible) economic 
work that leads to mis-measurement of women’s work and suggest methods to improve 
measurement. We find that being primarily responsible for domestic chores lower the probability 
of “working”, after accounting for all the conventional factors. We also document how, for 
women,  being out of paid work is not synonymous with care or domestic work, as they are 
involved in expenditure saving activities. We also find that religion and visible markers such as 
veiling are not significant determinants of the probability of working. Our data shows substantial 
unmet demand for work. Given that women are primarily responsible for domestic chores, we 
also document that women express a demand for work that would be compatible with household 
chores.  
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1. Introduction 
 
India has among the lowest female labor force participation rates (LFPRs) in the world.  Indeed, 
despite high rates of economic growth and rapid structural change, female participation rates 
have been declining.  The official periodic labor force survey on employment and unemployment 
by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) for 2011-12 estimated LFPR to be roughly 
25 percent for women between 16-60 years, down from 30 percent in 1999-20002. The 
corresponding figures for men are roughly 82 and 80 respectively. There are thus two separate 
questions that the literature on women’s labor force participation in India has focused on: its 
historically low rates and its recent decline.  
 
This paper seeks to address the first question drawing on a purposively designed survey of 
women’s labor force behavior in seven districts, both urban and rural, in the state of West Bengal 
in 2017. Given the cross-sectional nature of our data we cannot throw much light on why the 
female rates have declined in West Bengal, as they have in much of India.  Instead the primary 
objective of the paper is to discuss the different explanations put forward in the literature for 
India’s stubbornly low rates of female labor force participation, and explore the extent to which 
they help to make sense of the story coming out of our West Bengal data.     
 
 
2. Alternative explanations for low FLPRs in India 
 
These explanations can be divided into three broad categories. The first category focuses on the 
issue of measurement.  Most studies of the labor force participation in India rely on the NSSO 
household surveys.  While the definition of economic activity in the NSSO is broadly in line with 
internationally accepted definitions, the distinction between unpaid family workers and those 
exclusively engaged in domestic duties is not always consistently applied. As a result, 
economically active individuals may be erroneously classified as inactive (Hirway and Jose, 2011; 
Sudarshan 2014). Since it is largely women who dominate in these activities, it has been suggested 
that low rates of female participation reflect the failure of official statistics to correctly 
conceptualize and measure women’s contribution to the economy.   
 
The second category draws on the economic literature. Demand-side explanations have focused 
on the lack of demand for labor in the occupations and activities in which women are 
concentrated. Education is one factor that determines how employable women are. Various 
studies have noted the U-shaped relationship between women’s educational attainment and their 
labor force participation (Kingdon and Unni, 2001; Chatterjee et al. 2015). The highest rates of 
participation are found among illiterate women at one end of the educational spectrum, and 
among women with tertiary at the other end. This would suggest that the dearth of demand 
explanation applies most strongly to jobs suitable for women with primary and secondary 
education. Women with no education take up poorly paid and unskilled wage labor which is 
unappealing to women with some education while participation rates rise again among those with 
higher levels of education who can access better paid white collar jobs (Kingdon and Unni 2001).  
 
On the supply side, explanations focus on the household’s economic status and child care 
responsibilities. They point out that poverty appears to be a major factor behind women’s 
economic activity. It is generally women from the poorest households who report the highest 
rates of economic activity - and continue to do so, despite the fact that they have reported the 
greatest decline in recent years (Olsen and Mehta, 2006; Srivastava and Srivastava 2010).  As 
household per capita income rises, an ‘income’ effect appears to come into play, leading women 
to withdraw from withdraw from the labor force so that participation rates decline with rising 
income (Kapsos et al 2014; Srivastava and Srivastava, 2010).  
 																																																								2	These are figures based on the usual principal activity status (UPAS) which captures the work status for the majority 
time in the 12 months preceding the survey.  
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A third category of explanations draws on the sociological literature. It points to the powerful 
social norms, cutting across religious groups, which tie the honor and status of households with 
their ability to keep female family members within the home, leading to strict controls over 
women’s mobility in the public domain (Bardhan, 1985). It is only very poor and illiterate women 
who cannot afford to abide by norms of female seclusion who take up paid work. Sociological 
explanations have interpreted the withdrawal of women from the labor force with rising income 
or education as a ‘sanskritization’ effect as households seek to signal improvements in their status 
by emulating the behavior of higher caste or higher status households (Kingdon and Unni, 2001). 
The upward sloping part of the U-shaped relationship between education and women’s work is 
interpreted as the effects of ‘modernization’ and rising aspirations.  
 
Cultural restrictions on women’s mobility tend to be particularly severe for married women 
leading to a ‘marriage effect’ within the female labor force (Sudarshan and Bhattacharya 2009). 
This diverges from the ‘motherhood penalty’ found in the OECD literature (Hegewisch and 
Gornick 2011) where it is childcare responsibilities, rather than marriage per se that interrupts 
women’s ability to participate in the labour market (Chatterjee et al. 2015; Chaudhuri and Verick. 
2014). The relevance of marital status for women’s labor force participation can also been seen in 
the lower rates of participation by married women compared to divorced/widowed/separated 
women but here economic factors are also at play since the latter category tend to be poorer and 
less able to afford the status of staying at home.  
 
Other forms of social identity feature strongly in sociological explanations of women’s labor 
market behavior although these also tend to be bound up with economic explanations since 
social groups correspond significantly with income/wealth groups.  In particular, women from 
the lowest ranked Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Scheduled Castes (SC) groups3 who have the 
highest participation rates of all social group also come from the poorest households. Religion 
also features. Islam is generally associated with stricter controls over women’s public mobility 
than other religions and Muslim women have been found to have lower participation rates than 
women from the majority Hindu religion (Neff et al, 2012; Srivastava and Srivastava, 2010).  
 
2.1 The Primary Objectives and Main Results of This Paper 
 
Our paper goes beyond revisiting an older discussion on women’s labour force participation and 
makes the following new contributions. First, it notes low rates of FLFP in India and points to 
three sets of explanations: 1) mis-measurement 2) economic determinants and 3) cultural 
norms.  But if mis-measurement is the problem, then analysis of the determinants of FLFP have 
been working with an inaccurate dependent variable.  So we ask, what exactly do women do, 
what would more accurately measured estimates of labour force participation look like and how 
would the standard explanations look like with this more accurately measured variable. 
 
Second, we reference the larger literature, and note various areas of women’s work that do not 
enter Indian measures. We use these to, first of all, arrive at a more inclusive definition of 
‘conventional’ labour force participation than captured by Indian NSS (working for pay or doing 
work that saves household money); secondly an estimate of those doing ‘expenditure saving’ 
work;  thirdly, those out of the labour force.  In addition, we have measures of those with 
primary responsibility for activities that are explicitly excluded by labour force definitions, but 
that feminists have highlighted as part of women’s unpaid domestic and care responsibilities. 
  
Third, given that our conventional measure of female labour force participation is more inclusive 
than that estimated by NSS, our estimates show the determinants of women’s productive 
contributions to the household economy/labour market when it is measured accurately.   Finally, 
we ask very explicitly how the excluded activities of domestic/care work affect women’s ability to 
participate in conventional work participation and in expenditure saving activities.  The fact that 																																																								3	See Footnote 6 for details of these categories.		
		 4	
we are do it for both conventional labour force activity and for expenditure-saving makes our 
analysis particularly interesting and unique. 
 
Our main findings are that women being primarily responsible for routine domestic tasks such as 
cooking, cleaning and household maintenance, over and above the standard explanations in the 
literature (age, location, education and so on) as well as care responsibilities, lowers their 
probability of working. Factors traditionally viewed as cultural norms that constrain women’s 
participation in paid work, such as the practice of veiling or adherence to Islam, are insignificant 
in our analysis after the conventional variables have been accounted for. Given that the primary 
responsibility of domestic chores falls on the woman, we argue that the conventional definition 
of cultural norms needs to be revised, and shifted to focus on the real culprit, viz, the cultural 
norm that places the burden of domestic chores almost exclusively on women.  
 
 
3. Conceptualizing women’s work: alternative perspectives  
  
Our paper explores the relevance of these various explanations for the West Bengal context. We 
begin by considering the measurement issue, and some of the problems that have been 
highlighted in the international literature with regard to this.  One body of this literature relates to 
mainstream policy efforts to conceptualize the value created in an economy. The definitions used 
in the UN System of National Accounts, which are used to compute the GNP of a country, and 
those used by the ILO to measure the labor force of a country on the basis of its contribution to 
the GNP, both revolve around the production of market value (Waring,  1988).  The SNA 
initially confined itself to estimating the value of marketed goods and services while the ILO 
defined labor force activity as ‘work done for pay or profit’.  However, as Kuznets noted as early 
as 1947, ‘subsistence production’, viz. production carried out for own use and consumption by 
households, constituted a significant share of value produced in the less monetized economies of 
the world and ought to be included within the production boundaries of the SNA on the 
grounds that it was potentially marketable  (cited in Beneria et al., 2016)  
 
The UN SNA production boundary was gradually extended to include primary production in 
agriculture, fishing, mining and forestry, the processing of these products to make cheese, butter, 
flour and so on, as well as the production of other commodities which were consumed or sold in 
the market (Waring, 1988). These could be valued at the price at which they were sold or, if not 
sold, at the prices at which similar products were sold.  
 
The ILO’s definition of the labor force was also gradually extended so that by 1993, it included 
all persons of either sex who provided labor for the production of ‘economic goods and 
services’.  The earlier definition was extended to include all production and processing of primary 
products, whether for the market, for barter or for own consumption.  However, as Anker et al 
(1988) pointed out, many of the subsistence activities in which women were engaged in 
developing country contexts should have been included in estimates of the labor force by this 
definition, but were frequently not. Conventional practice at national levels frequently included 
certain categories of subsistence activities (such as crop production for self-consumption), but 
excluded others (free gathering of wood and fruit, processing crops to store or tending and 
milking animals for family use). As they observed, “it is almost as if the criteria have been made 
on the basis of existing knowledge on male and female activity patterns” (p.8). In addition, what 
continued to be explicitly excluded from ILO definitions were cooking, cleaning and caring for 
household members. This was, of course, the domestic work that was largely carried by women 
within the household on an unpaid basis.  
 
The second body of literature relevant to this paper relates to feminist efforts to challenge the 
exclusion of these predominantly female unpaid activities from estimates of the labor force as 
well as the GNP, an exclusion which devalued such work and rendered it invisible to 
policymakers. Feminists have sought to distinguish between the instrumentally valued production 
of goods and services for markets (exchange value) and the intrinsically valued production of 
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goods and services for the social reproduction of labor on a daily and generational basis (use 
value) (Beneria, 1981). They point out that many aspects of the unpaid work of social 
reproduction could be carried out as a market exchange so the decision to treat such work falling 
outside the sphere of the economy is completely arbitrary.  
 
With the spread of market relations and the emergence of domestic technologies4, the time that 
women spend in unpaid reproductive work in affluent countries has shrunk considerably and is 
now largely focused on ‘care’ activities, housework and looking after the family (Beneria, 1981).  
Women’s continued responsibility for this form of unpaid work has led to a predominance of 
part time work among those with young children and the ‘motherhood penalty’ we noted earlier 
in the wage distribution.   There has therefore been a great deal of attention to the question of 
care within the feminist economic literature, and to the elaboration of the idea of the care 
economy (Himmelweit, 1995; Folbre, 2006).  However, the growing dominance of the language 
of care to describe women’s domestic responsibilities has tended to overshadow the range of 
additional subsistence activities through which poorer women in the Global South continue to 
contribute to social reproduction of their families and communities.  
 
These different categories of work – market-oriented, subsistence-oriented and care-oriented – 
are the focus of this study. We are interested in their interactions in explaining women’s labor 
force behavior in the Indian context where women are responsible for both care and subsistence 
work, but where neither is counted, or not counted very well, by the Indian labor force surveys. 
This means that many of the generalizations made about women’s labor market behavior, 
including the explanations given for their low rates of engagement with the market, are based on 
incomplete data without little reference to these two important demands on women’s time that 
are likely to affect their ability to participate in more recognized forms of economic activity.   
 
Given that our survey was purposively designed to measure women’s labor force participation, as 
defined by the ILO, we were able to collect data on all three categories of work. We formulated 
our question on conventional labor force activity to ensure that women reported on forms of 
work that are included in the ILO definition.  We asked a separate series of questions on forms 
of subsistence work that should be included in labor force estimates, but that tend to get under-
reported by women themselves and overlooked by surveyors and census enumerators. And 
finally, we collected data on women’s household and care responsibilities. In the light of the rich 
and more carefully collected information on different aspects of women’s work yielded by our 
survey, we elaborate a bit further on the earlier objective outlined for this paper. Our objective is 
to explore the relevance of economic and sociological explanations for women’s engagement in 
the labor force, both in ‘conventional’ labor force activity and in subsistence activity, when some 
of the problems associated with measurement have been addressed. In addition, we estimate the 
effect of women’s unpaid domestic responsibilities on their participation in these different 
categories of labor force activity, over and above the standard explanations used in the literature 
(age, education, location etc.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								4 Greenwood et al (2005), for instance, track how progress in labor-saving consumer durables in the United States 
since 1900 led to a steady decline in hours spent in housework from 58 to 14 hours in 2011. This was accompanied by 
a steady rise in the labor force participation of married women. See also https://ourworldindata.org/women-in-the-
labor-force-determinants, accessed April 24, 2019	
 
		 6	
4. Data collection and definitions of labor force activity 
 
The data for this study were collected through a primary survey conducted in the state of West 
Bengal between July and September 2017 (WBLFS, 2017, hereafter)5. The sampling procedure 
was as follows. Our first-stage sampling units (FSUs) were districts. For the selection of FSUs, 
we used data on district per capita income compiled by the West Bengal government, and data 
from the national Census 2011 for the rural-urban and demographic composition of the districts.  
The criteria guiding the selection of FSUs were percentage of Muslims and per capita income, 
and in both dimensions, we wanted districts representing both the top and the bottom ends of 
the distribution. By capturing the richest districts, we also purposively oversampled urban and 
peri-urban residents in order to obtain a deeper understanding of urban women than is possible 
from secondary data (which is predominantly rural representing the underlying population 
distribution).  
 
Based on these criteria, the following seven districts were chosen: Murshidabad (highest 
proportion of Muslims); Howrah, North 24 Paraganas and South 24 Paraganas (in the top eight 
for Muslim share, as well as for per capita income); Bankura (one of the bottom three in per 
capita income); Purulia (one of the bottom three for income, as well as the one of the bottom 
two for Muslim share); Kolkata (richest district, fully urban). Originally, Darjeeling, a hill district, 
was also chosen to understand the hills versus plains differentiation, but the area was plagued 
with disturbances just during the time of our survey, because of which we had to drop that entire 
district.  
 
The second-stage units (SSUs) were villages/urban blocks. The SSUs were randomly chosen 
based on the sampling frame of the full list of villages/urban blocks from Census 2011 data. In 
order to avoid clustering, forty households per village/urban block were chosen randomly, 
covering all the hamlets within each village.  One woman per household was interviewed; and 
from roughly half the households, a man (not necessarily the woman’s husband) was interviewed. 
The final sample consisted of 3701 women and 1817 men.  
 
Close to 57 percent of our sample households lived in villages and 43 percent in towns. By 
design, our sample has a greater proportion of urban women, compared, for instance with the 
2011-12 NSS EUS, which is 27 percent urban. Roughly 9 percent of the respondents were from 
Bankura, 16 percent from Howrah, 16.7 percent from Kolkata, 15 percent from Murshidabad, 25 
percent from North 24-Parganas, 9.7 percent from Purulia and 7.5 percent from South 24-
Parganas.  
 
We paid particular attention in our questionnaire to questions relating to women’s work, given 
the widespread criticism levelled at the official estimates of this work. The problem of measuring 
women’s work in the Indian context has both practical and conceptual dimensions. On the 
practical side, there is the problem of under-reporting.  Both interviewers and respondents in the 
large-scale surveys used to gather information on labor force activity tend to discount many 
aspects of women’s work. In particular, they tend to view work that is unpaid and carried out 
within the domestic domain as an extension of housework (Jain, 1996, Deshpande, 2002 and 
2017, Chaudhary and Verick, 2014). In view of this, we laid particular emphasis on the training of 
our field workers and enumerators in order to sensitize them to these multiple issues related to 
measurement of women’s work.  																																																								5	One concern could be that by focusing on one state in a diverse and heterogenous country, we could be presenting a 
story that is not representative of India as a whole. Table A1 in the Appendix shows female labor force participation 
rates in West Bengal in a comparative perspective. We see that West Bengal is below the all-India average of women 
who report themselves to be working according to their usual principal activity status (UPAS), but is not the lowest. 
This validates our choice, as we would like to analyze a state with low FLFPR, but one which is not an outlier. We 
should also note that six of the states reporting high proportions of “working” women are predominantly tribal states, 
with communities that have historically had high labor force participation of women. If we exclude these states 
(Sikkim, Meghalaya, Sikkim, Mizoram, Chhatisgarh, Arunachal Pradesh, Uttaranchal), the relative rank of West Bengal 
(in terms of women who report themselves to be working) improves, while it remains below the national average.		
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However, the problem is not simply one of under-reporting, it also relates to the definition of 
labor force activity used in official statistics.  The NSS obtains the work status from Block 5 of 
the Employment-Unemployment Survey (EUS) in which work details of each individual 
household members are listed. The head of the household typically answers this, which makes it 
a highly likely source of under-reporting. Block 5.1 of the NSS EUS is essentially a household 
roster, where the respondent (typically the head of household) is asked to provide details about 
the “usual principal activity status” of each member of the household. This is the activity status 
of the person in the 365 days preceding the survey based on the “majority time criterion”, i.e. the 
activity on which the person spent a “relatively long time”. However, before this question is 
asked, the NSS surveyors make a dichotomous classification between “those in the labor force” 
(working or not working) and those not in the labor force. The latter are classified as out of the 
labor force, and all follow up questions about the usual principal activity status are asked only to 
those who are classified as “in the labor force” (p. A-6, NSS, 2011-12). Thus, if women are more 
likely to be classified as out of the labor force because their work is either home-based or unpaid 
or both, then no follow up questions about the nature of their involvement in productive work 
will be sought.  
 
 
We decided to use the NSS definition, but to extend it to capture the ILO definition and to 
include additional questions in order to ensure more accurate estimates of women’s labor force 
activities.  We also asked the questions of the woman herself, rather than the head of household 
or any other male respondent, and finally, given the interrupted and seasonal nature of women’s 
work, we did not restrict the number of days they were involved in an activity for it to count as 
labor force participation. Our question is, therefore, an improvement over the standard question 
in household surveys because of these three reasons. 
 
 
The first question was dichotomous one, which asked women whether they had engaged in any 
economic activity in the past 12 months, either earning an income or doing work that had saved 
household money. While the latter category falls into expenditure-saving activity of the kind that falls 
within the SNA boundary, it is excluded from NSS questionnaires. Those who answered “yes” to 
this question were classified as economically active by conventional criteria.  
 
Secondly, to those who answered “no” to this question, we asked a series of questions about 
different kinds of work that are likely to be considered part of their domestic duties, but which 
fall within the SNA production boundary. These questions are analogous to the NSS EUS Block 
7 questions that are administered to all those who have been classified as ‘attended to domestic 
duties’ or ‘attended domestic duties and engaged in free collection of goods for household use’, 
NSS codes 92 and 93 to which we will return in Section 6.  In the NSS data, these two categories 
are made up almost exclusively of women.  
 
Specifically, we asked about the following activities: working on kitchen gardens/orchards, 
rearing poultry, free collection of fish, small game, wild fruit, vegetables for household 
consumption, husking paddy, preparing jaggery (gur), preservation of meat or fish, weaving 
baskets/mats, making cowdung cakes for fuel, tailoring/weaving and tutoring of own or other 
children free of charge.  
 
The NSS questions ask women to answer “yes” or “no” to each of these questions. Again, we 
tweaked this format slightly. We asked about each activity separately in a set of two questions: 
first, whether they were involved in that activity, and second, if they did the activity not just for 
own use/consumption but to support family’s income generating work.  
 
We classified those who answered “yes” to the second question, i.e. those who did these activities 
as income support as economically active. If women had answered “no” to the first question, as 
well as to the series of follow-up questions, but their households possessed agricultural land or 
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livestock, we classified them as “economically active” because of the evidence that women who 
belong to such households contribute to household economic activity as a part of their domestic 
duties.  Several women reported doing multiple activities; we count all women who do at least 
one activity in this definition (i.e. additional activities are not double counted). 
 
We counted these women as economically active according to expenditure saving criteria. It is 
worth noting that this extended definition does not include care work and domestic chores, but 
only those unpaid activities that fall within the conventional boundary, frequently treated by 
women themselves as part of their routine domestic duties.  
 
Finally, we classified all remaining women, those were not classified as economically active by 
either conventional or expenditure-saving criteria, as out of the labor force (OLF).  These are women 
who do at least one of the activities counted in the extended definition of production for home 
use. In our data, we find 63 percent of these women do at least one of the activities; 15 percent 
do three. Given that these are expenditure saving economic activities, the demarcation between 
doing them exclusively for home use versus for economic help is fuzzy. Thus, the line dividing 
women who are included in the expanded definition of economic activity, and those classified as 
unpaid/OLF is a blurred one. We should note that all women do at least one economic activity, 
either for home use or as unpaid labor in household economic activities.  
 
One point to bear in mind is that although our study is based on a single cross-sectional survey 
and hence cannot contribute to debates about the decline of female labor force participation in 
recent decades, we are examining the results of this decline at a particular point in time6.  
 
 
 
5. Variations in female participation in conventional work and expenditure saving 
activity  
 
Table 1 allows us to compare the estimates provided by our three labor force categories in the 
districts covered by our survey. It also includes estimates from the 68th round of the National 
Sample Survey (NSS), Employment-Unemployment Survey (EUS) conducted in 2011-12.  
 
 
Table 1 somewhere here.  
 
Using the conventional definition, our estimate of FLFPR is 27.85 percent. This is significantly 
higher than the 16 percent for the entire state of West Bengal from the 68th round of NSS EUS 
of 2011-12, which is the closest survey for which data are publicly available. Apart from the gap 
of six years between our survey and that of the NSS, another reason that would account for the 
divergence between these two figures is that our sample is from seven districts, whereas the NSS 
estimate is based on the entire state. Adding both conventional economic and expenditure-saving 
activity, we get a female labor force participation rate of 52 percent.  
 
																																																								6	Without going into the substantial literature that investigates the decline, we note that the issue of decline is related 
to the changing nature of work availability, especially for rural and less educated women. There is important work 
which questions the “decline": Desai (2017); Desai et al (2018), Chatterjee et al (2015). This work shows that the 
proportion of economically active women has not declined, but the number of days they work has, which shows up as 
a decline in the labour force participation rates. In India over the last three decades, there has been a massive decline in 
agricultural jobs, and this has not necessarily been accompanied by an increase in manufacturing jobs, and/or wage 
employment. There has been movement out of agriculture into informal and casual jobs, where the work is sporadic, 
and often less than 30 days at a stretch. The new modern sector opportunities mostly accruing to men. Gupta (2017) 
investigates the effect of trade liberalisation in India (post-1991) on women's employment, and finds that 
establishments exposed to larger tariff reductions reduced their share of female workers. 	
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Again, here a concern might be that our higher estimates reflect that we selectively chose districts 
with higher female LFPRs compared to the other districts in the state. Table A2 in the Appendix 
shows the distribution of women’s work status according to the NSS EUS 2011-12. This reveals 
that the sample districts lie both above and below the state average.  
 
Table 1 also reveals that the district-level variations in participation rates is not neatly associated 
either with proportion of Muslims in the district, typically associated with greater social 
conservatism with regard to women’s work, or with the economic status of the district. 
Murshidabad, which has the highest proportion of Muslims in the state, has the third highest 
participation rates. And while Kolkata, the richest district in our survey, has the highest 
participation rates, it is followed by Bankura, one of the poorest. Prima facie, it appears that 
simple explanations based on income or religious/cultural differences do not contribute a great 
deal to understanding inter-district variations.  
 
Table 2 presents key summary statistics by our three labor force categories: conventional 
economic activity; expenditure-saving activity; and out of the labor force.  
 
Table 2 somewhere here 
 
These include statistics on age, education, marital status, religion, caste7, monthly per capita 
income, ownership of livestock and poultry and female headship.  Along with religion, we 
included a variable on whether women veiled or not, an indicator of cultural norms. This took 
the form of asking women if they covered their heads sometimes, always, or never, using either a 
burqa, hijab, niqab (varieties of ways that Muslim women cover their heads or faces) or ghunghat or 
veil (typical ways that Hindu women might cover their heads). We created a dummy variable 
called “veiling”, which took the value 1 if they covered their heads sometimes or always, and 0 if 
they never covered their heads.   We see that the proportions of women who covered their heads 
was higher for those in expenditure saving activities, but similar for working women and the 
OLF category.  
 
The questionnaire had data on both productive and consumption assets. The former comprised 
of physical assets8, livestock9, retail shops (where readymade items are directly sold to consumers, 
and not to middlemen), and workshops (e.g. garage, pottery, tailoring etc, where household may 
or may not manufacture items and sell to both customers and middlemen). Consumption assets 
comprised of simple household items10. Using Principal Component Analysis, we combined the 
production and consumer assets into two separate indices, one for each category of assets. The 
former can be seen as a rough proxy for wealth. The distribution of women across quartiles of 
both the consumer asset index and wealth index is not reported in Table 2, but available with the 
authors upon request.   
 
Finally, we collected information on women’s unpaid domestic responsibilities which are 
explicitly excluded from definitions of economic activity. These included childcare, care of the 
elderly and five domestic tasks: cooking, cleaning the house, washing clothes, household 																																																								
7 We divided the sample into five broad caste categories: Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), 
Other Backward Classes (OBC), Upper castes (UC), which are the non-Brahmin upper castes, and 
Brahmins. SC, ST and OBC are administrative categories formed for the purpose of reservation or 
affirmative action. Typically, most data sets have four categories, with “Others” being the residual 
category. We have data for the jati affiliation of respondents and are able to disaggregate the “Others” into 
the topmost ranked Brahmins and other upper castes. For details about jati classifications and 
administrative categories, see Deshpande (2017). 
8 Plough, harrow, pump/motor sets, bullock carts, tractor, spray pump, power tiller, borewell, drip 
irrigation sprinkler, hand tools (e.g. sickle, shovel, axe)  
9 Cows, bulls, buffaloes, goats, sheep, poultry, pigs 
10 Sewing machine, refrigerator, almirah, kerosene stove, gas stove, bicycle, two-wheeler, 
car/jeep/tempo/mini-truck, telephone, mobile phone, television, VCR/CD/DVD player, electric fan, 
computer/laptop, pressure cooker, cooler, radio. 	
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maintenance and fetching water. This can be seen as constituting the local equivalent of ‘care’ 
work, although they are generally more time consuming than equivalent activities in the global 
North. Fetching water, for instance, can be from the household tap, or from a water source some 
distance away from the household. Cooking too may involve using a gas stove or having to walk 
miles in search of fuel.  
 
As far as household tasks are concerned, women reported an average of four tasks. In addition, 
53 percent of women reported themselves to be solely responsible for childcare, and close to 71 
percent for elderly care. The proportion responsible for elderly care was higher in the OLF 
categories, compared to economic active ones. The proportions solely responsible for childcare 
was lower among women in conventional economic activity.  
 
The literature on female labor force participation has noted the importance of education and 
income. Before we move to the full-fledged analysis of determinants of female LFPR, we can 
check the nature of correlations between FLFPR and these variables.   
 
Figure 1 somewhere here. 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of women by the three LF categories within the four broad 
educational categories. We see that as compared to illiterate women, proportions of working 
women with primary and secondary education are lower, but this proportion increases for 
women with post-secondary education, indicating a rough U shape. For women who are 
economically active in ES activities, we see a rough inverse-U, indicating that there may not be 
sufficient work opportunities for women with primary and secondary levels of education.  
 
Figure 2 somewhere here.  
 
 
Similarly, Figure 2 displays distribution of women in the three LF categories across wealth as 
measured by quartiles of the productive asset index. We see that women from wealthier 
households are more likely to be working and less likely to be in expenditure saving activities.  
 
 
Finally, Figure 3 plots the distribution of women in the three LF categories across four quartiles 
of MPCE, which shows a similar pattern as in Figure 2. The proportion of working women in 
the lowest quartile is the same as that in the highest quartile.  
 
Figure 3 somewhere here.  
 
Of course, the underlying causality in the relationship between women’s work on the one hand, 
and household wealth and MPCE on the other, would be bi-directional: households where the 
women are working are likely to be wealthier. We should note that of the two, the productive 
asset index is less likely to be affected women’s incomes, especially for women earning low 
wages, given the items that appear in the productive asset index. Thus, it has the lowest problem 
of endogeneity or reverse causality. It is interesting that prima facie, there is no evidence of a 
wealth or income effect in the West Bengal data, i.e. women from wealthier families displaying 
lower LFPRs compared to women from less wealthy families.  
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5. Estimating women’s labor force participation  
 
5.1 Determinants of LFPR 
 
In this section we explore the main determinants of women’s economic activity. To that end, we 
estimated a multinomial logit model to estimate the probability of women being in conventional 
economic activity, expenditure-saving activity and out of the labor force. The probability of 
individual i being in the LF category j is  
 𝜋"# = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ()*()+ = 𝛼#	 +	𝑋"0𝛽#                     
 
 
where,  𝛼#	 is a constant, and 𝛽# is a vector of regression coefficients for j=1, 2, …J-1. The 
number of equations is one less than the number of outcomes, because one of the outcomes is 
arbitrarily set to zero so that the system is identified and we get unique solutions.  𝑋"0		is a vector 
of covariates that predict the probability of being in a given labor force category. Therefore, the 
individual 𝛽𝑠 measure the effect of individual covariates of being in a given outcome category, 
relative to the base outcome category, conditional on other covariates. Depending on the which 
category of the outcome variable is chosen as the base, the interpretation of the coefficients will 
change, but the predicted probabilities for the outcome variables will remain the same. We show 
the predicted probabilities below.  
 
Our estimation equation is the following:  
 
 
Pr (LFi) = 𝛼#	 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽; ∗ 𝑑𝑜𝑚_𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑠 + 𝛽B ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 +	𝛽E ∗𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒		 + 𝑋𝛽# + 	𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 
 
Where i= working or expenditure saving, relative to OLF 
 
where the X vector includes the standard variables used in the literature: age, age squared, 
rural/urban residence, educational categories, marital status, and household size and religion11. 
The contribution of our study is seen in the inclusion of covariates that are typically not included 
in quantitative analysis. One set of these new covariates captures the effect of domestic 
constraints, measured by three variables: whether the respondent is primarily responsible for 
child care; whether she is primarily responsible for elderly care; and the number of domestic 
chores she has to do.  The second set attempts to capture the effect of cultural norms. Along 
with religion, which does feature in the wider literature, we have included our measure for veiling 
practices, also taken as an indicator of conservative social norms. This is a dummy variable 
‘veiling’ which takes the value 1 if the woman covers her face sometimes or always. Standard 
errors are clustered at the village level.  
 
 The coefficients of interest are 𝛽3 to 𝛽E, as these capture the effects of cultural norms and 
care/unpaid work. 
 
 
We have not included wealth quartiles (as proxied by productive assets) because of the reverse 
causality mentioned above. However, Table A3 in the Appendix shows the results of this 
regression with additional controls for wealth quartiles, which indicates the direction and strength 
of the correlation between women’s work status and their household’s position in wealth 
																																																								
11 We have an alternative specification with caste instead of religion which show that the average marginal effect of 
caste is not significant (available with the authors upon request).  
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distribution. It also shows the strength and direction of the correlation between women’s work 
status and other co-variates when household wealth is controlled for.  
 
 
Figure 4 presents the average marginal effects (AMEs) of all the covariates for the two LF 
categories, working (conventional definition) and expenditure-saving activity (extended 
definition) respectively. AMEs are useful because they reflect the average of the marginal effects 
calculated at every value of the covariate, and therefore, convey information about the influence 
of each covariate on the outcome variable.   
 
As Figure 4 shows, in our sample the probability of working for urban women is higher than that 
for rural. We should note that our sample includes Kolkata and Howrah, two important 
economic locations in the state of West Bengal where jobs are more likely to be available than in 
other locations.  The relationship between age and “working” follows a fairly standard pattern, 
with activity rates increasing with age and then declining.  
 
Figure 4: Determinants of LFPR 
 
 
Relative to illiterate women, all other women are less likely to be working, thus in the conditional 
estimates, the U-shaped we had earlier observed in the descriptive statistics disappears.   Relative 
to currently married women, all other categories of women (never married, widowed and 
divorced) are more likely to be working, reflecting the ‘marriage effect’ we noted earlier.  
 
The story of cultural norms and religious differences is not supported by our sample. Women 
who veil have the same probability of working as women who never veil, and Muslim women 
have the same probability of working as Hindu women.   
 
Very few women in our sample had children under five, but other variables capture their ‘care 
responsibilities’.  We find that each additional domestic chore for which the woman is primarily 
responsible -- out of the five for which we collected data (cooking, cleaning, household 
maintenance, washing clothes and collecting water) – lowers the probability of conventional 
economic activity.  This is over and above the effect of household size, which has a similar effect. 
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Primary responsibility for child care has no effect on the probability of “working”, but 
interestingly, primary responsibility for elder care increases it.  
 
Turning to the results on expenditure-saving activity, we find that urban women are less likely to 
be in expenditure saving work relative to rural. If we revisit the activities that make up 
expenditure-saving work, it is clear that they are harder to carry out in the built-up environment 
of urban areas. Relative to illiterate women, women with primary and secondary education are 
more likely to be in ES work. Cultural norms also seem to matter. Compared to women from 
Hindu households, women from Muslim households are less likely, while women from other 
religions are more likely, to be engaged in ES work. Women who veil are more likely to be in ES 
than those who don’t.  
 
Every additional domestic task increases the probability of being in ES work. This is consistent 
with the finding that every additional domestic task lowers the probability of being in 
conventional economic activity.   While child care did not appear to have any effect on whether 
women ‘worked’ or not, it does increase the probability of being in ES work while elderly care 
decreases this probability.  
 
Finally, Table A3 which estimates the same regressions, but includes wealth quartiles suggests 
that wealth is not a significant predictor of women’s participation in either conventional labor 
force activity or in expenditure-saving work, over and above other predictors.  
 
 
5.2 Domestic Work and Labor Saving Devices 
 
A number of the findings that emerge from our analysis can be explored in greater depth using  
information from our survey. One of these is the constraining effect of women’s primary 
responsibility for domestic chores on their ability to participate in conventionally defined work, 
leading many to engage in expenditure saving work. We noted earlier the importance of labor-
saving consumer durables in reducing the amount of time spent in housework in earlier-
industrialized countries like the US.  We explore whether this factor is relevant in the West 
Bengal context.  From the data collected on household assets, we identified five simple gadgets – 
refrigerator, mixer, gas, washing machine and pressure cooker – that could be termed labor-
saving devices. A simple regression of whether the woman is primarily responsible for domestic 
chores on the number of these five labor saving devices shows that an increase in the number of 
these gadgets reduces the likelihood of woman being primarily responsible for the five domestic 
chores (Table 3).  
 
Table 3 somewhere here 
 
 
This is a simple correlation.  It is likely to be the case that working women are likely to have 
more gadgets, compared to women who are not working. But a plausible interpretation of Table 
3 is that the presence of labor-saving gadgets reduces the demands of domestic chores for 
working women, perhaps enabling them to take up conventional economic activity or at least 
allows these chores to be shared with other household members (generally other female 
members) so that they no longer have primary responsibility.  
 
 
5.3 Is there an unmet demand for work? 
 
The literature reviewed earlier suggested the possibility of an unmet demand for paid work. We 
explore the evidence for this in our survey. We asked women who were classified as OLF if they 
would accept paid work if it was made available at or near their homes.  73.5 percent said “yes”. 
Figure 5 shows the average marginal effects of the logistic estimation of the demand for work, 
measured as a yes response to this question.   
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Figure 5: Factors Affecting Demand for Work 
 
 
 
 
We find that among the OLF category, urban women have a lower demand for paid work 
compared to rural; never married women have a lower demand and widowed women have a 
higher demand for such work than those who are currently married; women primarily 
responsible for childcare have a lower demand for work, but those with elderly care have a higher 
demand as do, to a lesser extent, those responsible for domestic tasks. Veiling, education and 
religious differences are not significant.  
 
When questioned further, 18.7 percent expressed a preference for regular full-time, 7.8 percent 
for regular part-time; 67.8 percent for occasional full time and 5.78 percent for occasional part 
time.  It would appear that there was indeed a major unmet demand for paid work, whether 
regular or occasional, full time or part time as long as the work in question was compatible with 
their domestic responsibilities. Based on this, we would suggest that being out of the labor force 
is less a matter of choice for large numbers of women and more a reflection of the demands of 
unpaid domestic responsibilities.  
 
5.4 The relevance of cultural norms 
 
We also considered the influence of cultural constraints on women’s labor force participation. 
These did not appear to have much significance in the West Bengal context. Religious differences 
appeared largely irrelevant in determining whether women participated in conventional work. 
They do differentiate involvement in expenditure saving work, with Muslim women less likely, 
and women from other religious groups more likely, than Hindu women to be in such work 
rather than out of the labor force.  The practice of ‘veiling’ was also insignificant in determining 
whether women were engaged in conventional work but increased the likelihood that they were 
in expenditure saving work rather than OLF. So the preoccupation with Islam and with 
adherence to cultural norms, at least in dress, as explanations of women’s labor force activity may 
be misplaced in the context of West Bengal.  
 
Of greater significance in our findings are the cultural norms governing the gender division of 
unpaid domestic and care work and the disproportionate responsibility assigned to women for 
this work. In fact, primary responsibility for domestic work emerges as more important than 
responsibility for care in constraining women’s ability to participate in the conventional labor 
force. While Figure 4 suggests that women with primary responsibility for elderly care increases 
the probability of conventional work, this may reflect the costs of taking care of the elderly. This 
		 15	
is supported by the fact that those out of work in this group are more likely to express a demand 
for paid work at or near the home. However, according to Table A3, once wealth is controlled 
for, the effect on participation in conventional work disappears, women are less likely to engage 
in expenditure-saving activities and more likely to be out of the labor force. Primary 
responsibility for child care has no significant impact on the likelihood that women participate in 
conventional work, with or without controls for wealth. While this is not surprising, given that 
the average age of women in our sample is 36, it is also in line with findings from other studies. 
Those out of work in this group are less likely than others to express a demand for paid work, 
suggesting that, for the time being at least, these women prefer to remain out of the labor force.  
 
Primary responsibility for domestic chores, on the other hand, significantly reduces the likelihood 
of participation in conventional work and increases the likelihood of expenditure saving activity. 
Controlling for wealth does not make no difference to these results. In addition, those primarily 
responsibility for domestic chores who are not in the labor force are likely to express a desire for 
paid work – suggesting an unmet need for work among this group.  
 
The impact of domestic chores relative to care responsibilities on women’s labor force 
participation resonates with other evidence.  For instance, in a study by Chopra et al based in 
India, Nepal, Rwanda and Tanzania, it was found that in both nuclear and extended families, the 
proportions of women solely responsible for housework/domestic chores were much higher 
than proportions for women solely responsible for childcare (Chopra et al, 2017).  
 
If domestic chores emerge as an important determinant of women’s labor force participation, 
after controlling for the standard explanatory factors, the question thus arises is this: to what 
extent do the low LFPRs found in India in particular, but in South Asia and MENA countries 
more broadly, reflect international differences in women’s involvement in housework? There is 
some indicative evidence that indeed, in these regions, women spend more time on unpaid care 
work, broadly defined (i.e. including care of persons, housework or other voluntary care work), 
relative to a range of other developing and developed countries in the world.  As Figure 6 shows, 
in 2014, the female to male ratio of time devoted to unpaid care work was 10.25 and 9.83 in 
Pakistan and India respectively – the two countries with the lowest female LFPRs within South 
Asia -- compared to 1.85 in UK and 1.61 in the US. 
 
Figure 6 somewhere here. 
 
6 Concluding Comments 
 
Based on primary data from a large household survey in seven districts in West Bengal in India, 
this paper analyzes the reasons underlying low rates of labor force participation of women. In 
particular, it has tried to disentangle the intertwined strands of constraints, opportunities and 
norms in explaining these rates.  We designed our survey to capture women’s engagement in the 
conventional labor force more accurately than is the case in the official surveys.  While this gave 
us higher estimates of women’s conventional work participation than the official statistics, they 
were still fairly low (28%), with 23% of women engaged in expenditure saving activities and 48% 
out of the labor force.  In this concluding section, we summarize how the findings based on our 
more inclusive estimate of women’s labor force participation differ from those reported by 
studies that rely on the more narrow estimates to be found in the official data. In addition, we 
discuss the specific contributions of our study.  
 
We find that some of the effects of the standard variables used in our analysis converged with 
those found in the wider Indian literature: age and age squared, marital status and education. 
Religion, on the other hand, was not significant in our study nor was veiling, two indicators of 
social norms. Participation rates were found to be higher in urban areas than in rural, contrary to 
what studies using national data have found. Note that the insignificance of religion is not an 
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artefact of our study; a similar regression using national level NSS EUS data also finds religious 
difference in work participation to be largely insignificant12.  
 
 
 6.1 Not “Working”?  
 
However, an important insight that our analysis contributes to the general literature is the finding 
that many of the women who were not conventional forms of labor force activity were not 
necessarily outside the labor force. Rather many of them were involved in expenditure saving 
activities. So we find that while women with education, married women and women with primary 
responsibility for child care and domestic chores were less likely than illiterate women, divorced, 
separated, widowed and unmarried women to be in the conventional labor force, they were at the 
same time more likely to be in expenditure saving activities rather than outside the labor force. 
 
This result highlights the larger question of what is it that women do when they are not working 
outside in the home in paid activities. The 32nd round of the NSS EUS, conducted in 1977-78 
marked the first attempt in the Indian official LF statistics to understand women’s work. As Sen 
and Sen (1985) argue, in “partly commodified rural economies, the dividing line between 
domestic work and economic activity is fuzzy (p. WS-49). Jain (1996) also emphasizes that 
unpaid work by women should not necessarily be seen as household care work.	
 
 
The NSS introduced questions with Code 92 and 93 to capture women’s domestic work, 
especially domestic work that combined home-based economic activity. Sen and Sen (1985) find 
a strong negative correlation between women’s LFPR and the economic components of code 93, 
which capture resource-based activities around the home, when such resources are available. 
Thus, women from the poorest households, where the need for cash incomes is the strongest 
and there is a paucity of owned resources, tend to display high LFPRs, as our study confirms. 
Women in the middle part of the income/wealth distribution might not be seen in work outside 
the home, but they are engaged in expenditure saving work, i.e. they substitute work outside the 
home with a range of economic activities in and around the home, and not purely non-economic 
domestic work alone.  
 
 
The other important insight offered by our study relates to the effects of women’s unpaid 
domestic responsibilities, variables not typically included in other labor force surveys, on other 
aspects of their work.  Our results support the findings of other studies that it is marriage rather 
than motherhood that is the main constraint on women’s participation in conventional work. 
Primary responsibility for child care is not a significant constraint on women’s ability to 
participation in conventional work, but primary responsibility for domestic chores is, regardless 
of marital status. This is an important finding and testifies to the heavy burden that domestic 
work can represent in contexts where labor-saving infrastructure, utilities and technologies are 
not widespread.  
 
So while we were interested in the effects of cultural norms relating to religion and veiling on 
women’s labor force behavior, our study suggests that in the West Bengal context at least, neither 
religion nor the practice of veiling appeared to constrain women’s participation in conventional 
work. Indeed, religion is largely insignificant even in the NSS data. Instead, the cultural norms 
relating to the gender division of unpaid labor appeared to have much greater significance.  Not 
only were women’s unpaid domestic responsibilities far more significant in constraining 
conventional labor force participation, but we found substantial unmet need for paid work 
among women outside the labor force but on terms that would allow them to manage their 
household responsibilities. The resilience of cultural norms governing the gender division of 
unpaid labor is relevant beyond West Bengal. As Figure 6 showed, gender asymmetries in 																																																								12	Results available with authors upon request.		
		 17	
responsibility for unpaid care work can be found in a range of developed and developing 
economies but as the figure also showed, India and Pakistan have far more marked gender 
asymmetries than the other countries on which data is reported.  
 
Based on the results of this paper, we would argue that the definition of cultural norms needs to 
be rearticulated or shifted to reflect unequal sharing of domestic, unpaid care work, from its 
current focus on religious differences, especially the spotlight on Islam or veiling as a constraint 
to labour force participation.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
Table 1: Female Labour Force Participation Rates, WBLFS 2017 and NSS (2011-12) 
 	
	Notes:	In	the	NSS	figures,	“Working”	refers	to	all	women	with	upas	codes	11	to	51.	Involuntary	unemployment	refers	to	upas	code	81	(did	not	work,	but	was	seeking	and/or	available	for	work),	domestic	refers	to	upas	codes	92	and	93	(women	engaged	in	domestic	duties,	as	well	as	in	unpaid	economic	activities	free	collection	of	goods,	as	well	as	sewing,	tutoring,	weaving	etc.		for	household	use),	and	OLF	refers	to	all	remaining	women	who	are	out	of	the	labour	force	for	various	reasons.				Source:	Authors’	Calculations.						 	
Principal Actiivity Status of Women,  WBLFS, 2017
% of women 16-60 yrs
Howrah Murshidabad Kolkata North 24 Bankura Purulia South 24 Total Sample
Conventional 28.31 30.78 37.74 22.92 33.04 21.47 19.2 28
N 169 169 214 212 111 76 53 1,004
Extended 24.46 31.33 16.23 17.08 27.38 29.38 34.78 23.86
N 146 172 92 158 92 104 96 860
OLF 47.24 37.89 46.03 60 39.58 49.15 46.01 48.28
N 282 208 261 555 133 174 127 1,740
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 597 549 567 925 336 354 276 3,604
UPAS of Women, NSS 68th Round, Unemployment-Unemployment Survey, 2011-12
% of women 16-60 yrs West Bengal
Working 13.15 22.07 14.56 19.75 10.69 19.08 19.12 15.99
Invol Unemp 3.5 0.94 1.12 0.61 0.2 0.74 1.38 1.07
Domestic 74.41 64.61 75.94 71.12 77.15 65.98 72.42 73.6
OLF 8.94 12.39 8.38 8.53 11.95 14.2 7.08 9.34
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by LF Categories 	
	
Source: Authors’ Calculations based on WBLFS, 2017. 
 	
Table 3: OLS estimation of domestic tasks 									 	
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Figure 3 	
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Figure 5 
	Source:	https://ourworldindata.org/female-labor-force-participation-key-facts,	accessed	24	April	2019	 	
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Distribution of Usual Principal Activity Status (UPAS) of Women, age 16-60, 
Major States, 2011-12 	
		
Notes: “Working” refers to all women with upas codes 11 to 51. Involuntary unemployment refers to upas code 81 
(did not work, but was seeking and/or available for work), domestic refers to upas codes 92 and 93 (women engaged 
in domestic duties, as well as in unpaid economic activities free collection of goods, as well as sewing, tutoring, 
weaving etc.  for household use), and OLF refers to all remaining women who are out of the labour force for various 
reasons.  
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on NSS 68th Round, EUS, 2011-12 
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		Table	A2:	Women’s	LFPR	by	district,	West	Bengal,	2011-12		
	
Source: Authors’ calculation based on NSS EUS, 2011-12. The districts highlighted in bold are included in our sample.  					
Table A3: Probability of LF categories: AMEs of with added controls for wealth 
quartiles  
 
Working Invol Unemp Domestic OLF Total
Darjiling 15.28 3.68 67.29 13.75 100
Jalpaiguri 20.16 0.08 68.44 11.32 100
Koch Bihar 14.41 0.41 76.78 8.4 100
Uttar Dinajpur 19.47 0.09 72.11 8.33 100
Dakshin Dinajpur 9.09 0.47 77.7 12.73 100
Maldah 18.14 0 73.79 8.06 100
Murshidabad 22.07 0.94 64.61 12.39 100
Birbhum 13.75 0.06 78.95 7.24 100
Nadia 18.27 0.26 74.43 7.05 100
North 24-Parganas 19.75 0.61 71.12 8.53 100
Kolkata 14.56 1.12 75.94 8.38 100
South 24-Parganas 19.12 1.38 72.42 7.08 100
Barddhaman 16 0.29 71.82 11.89 100
Hugli 8.92 0 83.97 7.11 100
Howrah 13.15 3.5 74.41 8.94 100
Bankura 10.69 0.2 77.15 11.95 100
Puruliya 19.08 0.74 65.98 14.2 100
Paschim Midnapur 15.87 1.28 75.07 7.78 100
Purba Midnapur 8.29 3.31 80.4 8 100
West Bengal 15.99 1.07 73.6 9.34 100
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t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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